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RACIAL PROFILING: "DRIVING WHILE MEXICAN"
AND AFFIRMATIVE ACTIONt
Victor C. Romero*
This Essay will focus on "racial profiling" not just in the way many
people think about the term-that is, with respect to stopping motorists
for traffic violations based solely on their race, so-called "Driving While
Mexican" or "Driving While Black"-but also in the context of
"affirmative action"-namely, using race as a factor in employment and
educational decisions. More broadly, then, I want us to think of "racial
profiling" as simply "the use of race to develop an understanding of an
individual," which moves us slightly away from more pejorative notions
of the phrase that have seeped into the national consciousness.'
My thesis is as follows: When discussing "racial profiling" in the
context of "Driving While Mexican/Black"2 or "affirmative action,",
3
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1. See, e.g., infra note 2 (discussing "racial profiling" in the context of automobile
stops).
2. This term snidely refers to automobile searches and stops by Immigration and
Naturalization Service ("INS") agents of Black- and Latino/a-looking individuals solely
on the basis of their Black or Brown skin. See Kevin R. Johnson, The Case Against Race
Profiling in Immigration Enforcement: Why Stops for "Driving While Brown" Undermine the
Ideal of Full Membership and Equal Citizenship (unpublished manuscript on file with
author); see also Jim Yardley, Some Texans Say Border Patrol Singles Out Too Many Blameless
Hispanics, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2000, at A17 ("'Why were you stopped?' asks the local
joke. The answer: 'Driving while Mexican.' ").
Legal literature is replete with discussions of this phenomenon in the context of
traffic stops of African Americans for "Driving While Black." See, e.g., David A. Harris,
When Success Breeds Attack: The Coming Backlash Against Racial Profiling Studies, 6 MICH. J.
RACE & L. (forthcoming 2001); David A. Harris, The Stories, the Statistics, and the Law:
Why "Driving While Black" Matters, 84 MINN. L. REv. 265 (1999); Jennifer A. Larrabee,
"DWB (Driving While Black)" and Equal Protection: The Realities of an Unconstitutional Police
Practice, 6J.L. & POL'Y 291 (1997-98); Tracey Macin, Race and the Fourth Amendment, 51
VAND. L. REv. 333 (1998); Anthony C. Thompson, Stopping the Usual Suspects: Race and
the Fourth Amendment, 74 N.Y.U. L. REv. 956 (1999).
3. While "affirmative action" programs providing minority preferences in employ-
ment and education have come under considerable attack in recent years, some scholars
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many "conservative" and "liberal" commentators must make clear dis-
tinctions between whether race is a relevant concern, on the one hand,
and whether race should be a relevant concern on the other. Oftentimes,
pundits on the left and right merge the two concepts, causing confusion
and prompting charges of hypocrisy from the opposite camp.4
Let us consider two analytical alternatives to the conservative and
liberal camps: First, looking at the opinions of former Justice Lewis
Powell in United States v. Brignoni-Ponce5 and Regents of the University of
California v. Bakke, we can discern a "pragmatic or "centrist" ap-
proach to race-that is, the understanding that race matters in the
8
context of automobile stops and university admissions, 9 and, therefore,
that race should be a legitimate factor to consider in both situations.' A
argue for their continuation because minorities still do not compete on a "level playing
field" with Whites. See, e.g., Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Defending the Use of Quotas in Affirma-
tive Action: Attacking Racism in the Nineties, 1992 U. ILL. L. LEV. 1043, 1045 (arguing that
affirmative action remedies are still necessary in the 1990s because conditions for minori-
ties are still much worse than for Whites in American society); see also Lundy R.
Langston, Affirmative Action, A Look at South Africa and the United States: A Question of
Pigmentation or Leveling the Playing Field?, 13 AM. U. INT'L L. LEV. 333, 348-49 (1997)
(describing the "level playing field" metaphor: "President Lyndon B. Johnson actually
used the term 'affirmative action' and utilized a sports metaphor to illustrate the need to
level the playing field. 'Racism raised high hurdles and made it impossible for otherwise
equal runners to compete. Thus, when [Blacks] passed the baton to the next generation,
they did so running with less speed, having covered a shorter distance, and having less
stamina than they would have in a non-racist society.'" (internal citation omitted).
4. See infra text accompanying notes 17-27.
5. 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
6. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
7. Justice Powell has often been described as a "pragmatist" who sided exclusively
with neither the liberal nor the conservative justices on the Court. See, e.g., Craig Evan
Klafter, Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr.: A Pragmatic Relativist, 8 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 1 (1998).
8. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 886-87.
9. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 296 n.36.
10. At least one other commentator has noted in the Fourth Amendment and Equal
Protection contexts the "relevance of race" parallel that I draw here. See David A.
Strauss, Affirmative Action and the Public Interest, 1995 Sup. CT. REV. 1, 9 n.38:
The cne clear instance of the Supreme Court's allowing race (or national
origin) to be used as a basis for classifying people (since Brown) is ...
Brignoni-Ponce. ... Brignoni-Ponce ruled that law enforcement officers may
use Mexican-American ancestry as a 'relevant factor' . . . in determining
whether there is reasonable suspicion that a person is an undocumented
alien. The result in Brignoni-Ponce is consistent with the discussion in the
text in the sense that the Court did not consider any Equal Protection
issue in Brignoni-Ponce and so did not apply strict scrutiny. But it seems
reasonably clear that Brignoni-Ponce represents a category of cases in
which the courts would allow race or national origin to be used as a basis
for classification-for example, if police officers seeking a suspect con-
centrate on individuals whose race matches the description given by a
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second-and I submit, preferable-approach is the one espoused by
Critical Race Theorists who would agree with Powell that race is rele-
vant in both the automobile stop and university admissions, but that, as
a policy matter, race should not play a role in traffic stops, though it
should in affirmative action because of the power differential that exists
between the majority and minority races in American society.
First, let us explore the issue of racial profiling in the motoring
context, and more specifically, the issue of "Driving While Mexican."
A New York Times article describes the plight of federal judge Filemon
Vela, who was stopped by a Border Patrol agent along the Texas-
Mexico line, mistaking him for an undocumented immigrant" or a drug
smuggler.12 As Gilberto Hinojosa, a county judge who has had similar
troubles, sadly noted, "It feels like an occupied territory .... It does not
feel like we're in the United States of America." "'Why were you
stopped?' asks the local joke. The answer: 'Driving while Mexican.' 3
The Immigration and Naturalization Service defends its policy by
stating that these unfortunate mistakes are "rare because agents are
trained to distinguish undocumented immigrants from legal residents.
Rather than casting a wide net ... agents follow specific profiles to
identify suspects.' '14 They are quick to add that their good work has
resulted in dramatically fewer arrests of undocumented immigrants than
in previous years-25,053 in the last fiscal year, down from 66,135 in
witness. Thus the prohibition on the use of racial generalizations is not as
absolute as the cases suggest. But whatever accounts for the (presumed)
willingness to allow the use of racial criteria in cases like this-perhaps
the perceived importance of the interests on the other side, perhaps a
sense that the underlying generalization is less likely to be the result of
prejudice, perhaps the belief that the use of relatively unarticulated gen-
eralizations of this kind is less stigmatizing to minority groups-the
Supreme Court shows no inclination to apply a means-ends version of
strict scrutiny to racial classifications generally.
11. I prefer the terms "noncitizen" to "alien" and "undocumented immigrant" to
"illegal alien" because of the pejorative connotations attached to the word "alien."
However, I favor the term "alienage jurisprudence" rather than "citizenship jurispru-
dence" because the former captures the dehumanizing nature of such categorizations. See,
e.g., Victor C. Romero, The Domestic Fourth Amendment Rights of Undocumented Immi-
grants: On Guiterrez and the Tort Law-Immigration Law Parallel, 35 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REv. 57 (2000); Victor C. Romero, Equal Protection Held Hostage: Ransoming the Constitu-
tionality of the Hostage Taking Act, 91 Nw. U. L. REv. 573, 573 n.4 (1997); see also Kevin
R. Johnson, "Aliens" and the U.S. Immigration Law: The Social and Legal Construction of
Nonpersons, 28 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 263, 268 (1996-97) (discussing "how the
term alien masks the privilege of citizenship and helps to justify the status quo").
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1997.15 As Juan Lopez, a Border Patrol supervisor, stated when ques-
tioned about his experiences being stopped by fellow agents: "Do I get
offended? .. .No, I don't. Those guys are doing their job. 16
What accounts for these different reactions? The liberal perspective
suggests that race is irrelevant-that each person should be treated as an
individual and not as part of a group. As Joseph Carens has written in a
different context: "People should be free to pursue their own projects
• . .as long as this does not interfere with the legitimate claims of other
individuals to do otherwise.' ' 17 Thus, the liberal would contend, Judges
Vela and Hinojosa should have been allowed to travel as non-Latinos
do, free from harassing behavior on the part of the Border Patrol agents.
Conservatives like Dinesh D'Souza might describe such behavior
by the Border Patrol officers as "rational racism." In The End of Racism,
1 8
D'Souza relates the story of Michelle Joo, an Asian American shop-
keeper in Washington, D.C., who discriminates on the basis of race in
deciding whether or not to let prospective patrons into her jewelry and
cosmetics store.' 9 "Young black men are kept out if they seem rowdy,
Joo says.",20 This theory suggests that, in order to protect property, it is
15. See id.
16. Id.
17. Joseph H. Carens, Migration and Morality: A Liberal Egalitarian Perspective, in BRIAN
M. BARRY & ROBERT E. GOODIN, FREE MOVEMENT: ETHICAL ISSUES IN THE TRANSNA-
TIONAL MIGRATION OF PEOPLE AND OF MONEY 25, 26 (1992).
18. DINESH D'SOUZA, THE END OF RACISM (1995).
19. See id. at 259.
20. Id. A similar calculus is performed by New York taxi drivers on the night shift in
trying to determine which people would be safe to pick up. Sarah Kershaw, Cabby's Shift
Is a Night of Calculating Risks, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 2000, at Al, A24. Note the following
report filed by a New York Times reporter riding with livery-cab driver Angel Miranda
one early morning:
2:45 a.m. After picking up the Townsend Avenue fares-a woman and
her three young children-Mr. Miranda drops them off at Gerard Ave-
nue in the Concourse Village section. Another fare comes over the
radio. 'St. Nicholas and 145th,' the dispatcher shouts: a comer in Har-
lem. No one responds. There are about 100 drivers cruising the streets
on the overnight shift. If none of them press the button on their micro-
phones indicating they want a fare, the dispatchers shout out the location
again, up to five or six times. After the fifth broadcast of 'St. Nicholas
and 145th,' the dispatcher clarifies things: 'Hispanic female.' Another
driver quickly takes the call. Mr. Miranda acknowledges that the ex-
change appeared racist. Then he adds that although he uses the
dispatchers' codes as a guide, when he picks up a passenger on the street,
he goes by appearance, clothing, eye contact-'a vibe,' not race. During
the night he will drive past several people hailing him, all young men of
different races, explaining that they 'just didn't look right.'
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rational to discriminate against racial groups; the allegedly high statistical
correlation between race and crime make race relevant, contrary to
what liberals might assert. As applied to the automobile stop context,
the conservative would argue that using race as a factor is perfectly
reasonable because race is relevant-many undocumented immigrants
are Mexican 2' and therefore whether one looks Mexican is a rational
criterion to consider in determining whether to inquire into a person's
immigration status. Plus, picking up on Agent Lopez's sentiments, it is
irrational for liberals to be offended when the Border Patrol is simply
doing its job. For conservatives, race is relevant in the Border Patrol
context to try to ferret out undocumented immigrants, many of whom
are of Mexican appearance.
But let us consider the views of the liberal and conservative
camps on a different issue: affirmative action in the context of
university admissions. Affirmative action-the practice of considering
race as a factor in university admissions-is currently under attack in
Michigan22 and Florida,23 and it has been beaten down in Washington,24
Mr. Miranda says that Hispanic drivers are generally more comfortable
with Hispanic passengers, though he adds that drivers at his service gen-
erally do not discriminate through racial stereotyping.
In dangerous neighborhoods, he says, drivers simply avoid people
who look threatening-and threatening people can be of any color.
Id.
21. Of the estimated five million undocumented immigrants residing in the United
States in October 1996, an estimated 2.7 million, or 54%, were from Mexico. Immigra-
tion and Naturalization Service, Statistics on Illegal Resident Population, at http://
www.ins.usdoj.gov/text/aboutins/statistics/illegalalien/index.htm (last visited Feb. 12,
2000). However, as Kevin Johnson notes, "as of October 1996, over forty percent of the
undocumented persons had entered the country legally but overstayed their visas. Visa
overstays are generally unaffected by heightened border enforcement focused on unlawful
entry." Johnson, supra note 2, at 40-41.
22. Grutter v. Bollinger, No. 97-CV-75928-DT, 2001 WL 293196 (E.D. Mich.
2001) (finding law school's affirmative action policy unconstitutional), stay granted, Grut-
ter v. Bollinger, No. 01-1447, 2001 WL 327822 (6th Cir. 2001); Gratz v. Bollinger, 122
F. Supp. 2d 811 (E.D. Mich. 2000) (upholding University's affirmative action policy).
For a fascinating insider's look at the Michigan litigation, see 5 MICH. J. RACE & L. 241-
459 (1999) (containing expert reports submitted in Gratz and Grutter).
23. Florida Governor Jeb Bush introduced his program, "One Florida," designed to
end affirmative action in the state. See Peter T. Kilborn, Jeb Bush Roils Florida on Affirma-
tive Action, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2000, at Al, A23. The program is patterned after a
similar one implemented in Texas, his brother's home state. See id.
24. In November 1998 Washington voters approved Initiative 200 which, like
California's Proposition 209, bans the consideration of race and gender by state
institutions. See, e.g., Editorial, 1-200 Sets Washington on Uncertain Course, NEWS TRIB.
TACOMA, Nov. 5, 1998, at A10; V. Dion Haynes, Affirmative Action Foes Cheer Gains:
FALL 2000]
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Texas," and California16 in recent years.
Interestingly, the liberal and conservative observers switch positions
on the relevance of race in affirmative action. The liberal defends prefer-
ences as a way to "level the playing field" given the inequality of
opportunity among the groups. Race is relevant in the affirmative action
context, the liberal posits, because, for one thing, standardized tests are
racially biased against minority groups, thereby requiring corrective action
on the part of the university to disregard discrepancies in scores between
certain majority and minority groups.7
Backers See Growing Support for Initiatives Banning Preferences, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 23, 1998, at
6; Robert H. Kelley, The Washington Civil Rights Initiative: The Need for a Meaningful
Dialogue, 34 GONZ. L. Rav. 81 (1998-99). In addition, like the University of Michigan
and the University of Michigan Law School, the University of Washington School of
Law has recently been the target of an anti-affirmative action lawsuit. Both of these
actions are being funded by the Center for Individual Rights, a non-profit litigation
boutique that also filed the Hopwood case in Texas. See, e.g., Adam Cohen, The Next
Great Battle Over Affirmative Action, TIME, Nov. 10, 1997, at 50 (describing lawsuit filed
challenging University of Michigan's admissions policies); Terry Carter, On a Roll(back),
A.B.A. J., Feb. 1998, at 54-58 (describing involvement of the Center for Individual
Rights in anti-affirmative action lawsuits).
25. Perhaps the most infamous anti-affirmative action case of recent memory, Hop-
wood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1033 (1996), stands for
the proposition that race may not be used as a factor in law school admissions in the Fifth
Circuit, of which Texas is a part. 78 F.3d at 935.
26. California's Proposition 209, which eliminated the consideration of race and
gender in education and employment decisions, has been the subject of much scholarly
commentary. See, e.g., Girardeau A. Spann, Proposition 209, 47 DUKE LJ. 187 (1997);
Eugene Volokh, The California Civil Rights Initiative: An Interpretive Guide, 44 UCLA L.
REV. 1335 (1997); 1997 Symposium on Race and the Law, 11 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS &
PUB. POL'Y 1 (1997); Symposium, The Meanings of Merit: Affirmative Action and the Califor-
nia Civil Rights Initiative, 23 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 921 (1996).
Once a bastion of liberal politics, California recently approved yet another anti-
civil rights statute, Proposition 22, which states: "Only marriage between a man and a
woman is valid or recognized in California." See, e.g., V. Dion Haynes, California Vote
Going Against Gay Marriages, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 8, 2000, at 16; Associated Press, California
Passes Ban on Gay Marriages, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, Mar. 8, 2000, at 12A; see also
Evelyn Nieves, Bid to Thwart Gay Marriage Roils California, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 2000, at
Al, All.
27.
In the realm of law school admissions, for instance, the Law School Ad-
missions Test ("LSAT") is one very important measure of a prospective
law student's merit. But we know two things about the LSAT: First,
while the data are inconclusive about its ability to predict one's first-year
performance in law school, the LSAT does not predict whether the can-
didate will be a good attorney; second, and more importantly, one study
shows that white students, regardless of their socioeconomic background, per-
form better on the LSAT than African-, Asian-, Latino-, and Native-
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The conservative, on the other hand, argues that race is irrelevant
in admissions because only individual merit matters. Nothing prevents
the high-achieving minority student from effectively competing with
the White student except for the former's failure to perform as well on
the only measure that can help adequately assess candidates from differ-
ent educational backgrounds-the standardized test. In the con-
servative's view, race is irrelevant because it is difficult to argue that a
poor White student who performs better on the LSAT than a rich Black
student should be denied admission because the latter was denied a level
playing field.28 Generalized race statistics cannot be relevant in assessing
one individual's performance against another's.
Notice what has happened here. The liberal asserts the irrelevance of
race in the automobile stop context for the same reason that the
conservative pans affirmative action: race is not an accurate predictor in
evaluating a particular individual; put another way, "racial profiling" does
not work. Yet, both groups adopt a different perspective when arguing for
race relevance: race is relevant in "Driving While Mexican" cases, the
conservative claims, because, while respectable individuals such as judges
Vela and Hinojosa might unfortunately (but rarely) be targeted, they are
part of a larger group that contains non-respectable individuals (drug
smugglers and undocumented immigrants) who should properly be
targets of law enforcement. Analogously, the liberal contends that rich
Black individuals who might not be the most worthy recipients of
affirmative action preferences nonetheless belong to a class whose
members are disproportionately disadvantaged by university admissions
processes and standards.
Who is right? Is race relevant in only one context but not the other?
Both our hypothetical conservative and liberal should take a cue from
former Justice Lewis Powell's writings in the automobile stop and af-
firmative action contexts, and admit and make clear that race is relevant in
both situations.
First, let us examine Justice Powell's opinion in the original "Driving
While Mexican" case: Brignoni-Ponce. In that case, Border Patrol officers
stopped the respondent's car solely on the ground that he appeared to be
Americans of any socioeconomic background except for upper income
Asian Americans.
Victor C. Romero, Broadening Our World: Citizens and Immigrants of Color in America, 27
CAP. U. L. REv. 13, 21 (1998) (citations omitted).
28. "Scholars assail [race-based] preferences as divisive, stigmatizing, and harmful to
'innocent victims."' Chapin Cimino, Comment, Class-Based Preferences in Affirmative
Action Programs After Miller v. Johnson: A Race-Neutral Option, or Subterfuge?, 64 U. CHI.
L. Rav. 1289, 1289 (1997).
FALL, 2000]
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29Mexican. In invalidating that practice, the majority, speaking through
Justice Powell, stated:
We cannot conclude that [their apparent Mexican ancestry]
furnished reasonable grounds [for the officers] to believe that
the three occupants were aliens .... The likelihood that any
given person of Mexican ancestry is an alien is high enough
to make Mexican appearance a relevant factor, but standing
alone it does not justify stopping all Mexican-Americans to
ask if they are aliens .
Then, in Bakke, Powell voted to invalidate the University of Cali-
fornia Davis Medical School's affirmative action program, but not before
agreeing with four other justices that "race may be taken into account as a
factor in an admissions program .... Powell justified his position: "No
one denies the regrettable fact that there has been societal discrimination
in this country against various racial and ethnic groups. ' '32 He was unwill-
ing, however, to find that the Medical School had a substantial interest in
completely barring Allan Bakke, a White man, from competing with
other candidates of minority background by reserving certain admissions
slots for applicants of color only.
33
In both Brignoni-Ponce and Bakke, Justice Powell makes clear that
race is a relevant factor in automobile stops along the border as well as in
university admissions, something that is often left out of the popular dis-
course between left and right. This makes practical sense-along the
border, a large number of Mexicans enter the country without proper
documentation, and therefore, an individual's Mexican ancestry is rele-
vant; likewise, people of color have suffered racial discrimination in this
country in the form of barriers to education, and therefore, one's race is a
relevant factor in determining whether one has suffered such discrimina-
tion.
Now, I readily admit that I might have left nuance out of the argu-
ments posited by the right and left as I described them above. It is very
possible that both sides assume the relevance of race in both automobile
stops and affirmative action, but then only dispute the necessity of consid-
ering race in each context. However, I think the rhetoric often drowns
29. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 874-75 (1975).
30. Id. at 886-87 (emphasis added).
31. Regents of the Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 296 n.36 (1978).
32. Id.
33. See id. at 319-20.
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out the distinction,34 and it is an important one to make, as I will explore
as I return to Justice Powell's Brignoni-Ponce and Bakke opinions.
While I prefer the approach critical race scholars might take over his,
Justice Powell's decisions in Brignoni-Ponce and Bakke clearly state race's
relevance up front in both the automobile stop and affirmative action
context, which is an improvement over the stock conservative and liberal
stories. However, his decision not to explore the weight to accord that
relevance is troublesome. Ever a pragmatist, Powell acknowledged im-
plicitly in both Brignoni-Ponce and Bakke that we live in a racially
conscious society and that, in certain circumstances, race issues play a role
in our decision-making. Thus, Powell found it reasonable that INS agents
would use race as a factor in determining whether to question a suspected
border crosser because of the high correlation between apparent Mexican
appearance and undocumented status. Similarly, he was willing to have
universities look at one's racial background to determine one's eligibility
for college admission given the historical burdens placed on persons of
color in the area of educational opportunity.
However, Powell did not take the next step and ask himself whether
it was desirable to perpetuate the relevance of race by making it a factor in
both automobile stops and affirmative action. Put another way, Powell
saw that there existed in society an empirical relationship between race
and border patrol stops, on the one hand, and between race and college
eligibility, on the other, without asking whether society should, as a nor-
mative matter, encourage "racial profiling" in both contexts. Is it good to
stop motorists at the border partly on the basis of race? Does society
benefit from having affirmative action programs that consider race as a
factor in university admissions? Perhaps by affirming racial relevance in
both Brignoni-Ponce and Bakke, Powell implicitly answered "yes" to both
34. An example of this lack of nuance and reliance on empty rhetoric comes from
the failure of both the left and right to heed all the words of the Rev. Dr. Martin Luther
King, Jr. Some conservatives contend that King would have campaigned against affirma-
tive action, citing his famous "content of their character" speech. But King also wrote:
"Negroes have proceeded from a premise that equality means what it says . . . but most
whites in America, including many persons of good will, proceed from a premise that
equality is a loose expression for improvement. White America is not even psychologi-
cally organized to close the gap-essentially it seeks only to make it less painful and less
obvious but in most respects to retain it. Most of the abrasions between negroes and
white liberals arise from this fact." William Raspberry, Dream On, WASH. POST, Feb. 28,
2000, at A15.
On the other hand, some liberals have seen racial preferences as an entitlement
without considering personal responsibility. To this issue, King also spoke, "calling on
the victims of isolation and deprivation to improve their personal standards--the 'content
of their character'-even though it was their skin, not their character, that produced the
problems in the first place. What was needed, he said in a little-remembered phrase, is 'a
rhythmic alternation between attacking the causes and healing the effects.'" Id. (noting
failure of some to read King in proper context).
FALL 2000]
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questions, but since each was decided in a different constitutional context,
one can only speculate as to why.
This is where Critical Race Theory (CRT) might be able to fill the
normative gap created by Powell. CRT offers three insights that I will
highlight in this discussion: First, CRT posits that "racism is normal, not
aberrant, in American society., 35 Thus, while formal, dejure equality now
exists among the races, true defacto equality does not. Second, CRT starts
from the premise that "a culture constructs social reality in ways that
promote its own self-interest (or that of elite groups), 36 and so CRT
scholars or "race crits" "set out to construct a different reality. 3 7 And
third, as developed by Professor Derrick Bell, CRT subscribes to the
"interest-convergence" theory-that is, "that white elites will tolerate or
encourage racial advances for blacks [and other people of color] only
when they also promote white self-interest.
38
Let us examine how these themes play out in the "Driving While
Mexican" and "Affirmative Action" contexts. It is important at the outset
to remember and acknowledge that both CRT scholars and Powell agree
that race is relevant. What CRT adds, however, is an explanation as to
when race should be relevant. Race crits would distinguish between the
use of racial profiling in the automobile stop and affirmative action con-
texts based on the existing racial dynamic in society. Because the White
elite holds political and economic power in society, CRT would question
whether the use of race in a particular context perpetuates racial oppres-
sion of minorities or curtails it.39
CRT would therefore disfavor the use of race in the automobile stop
but likely approve it in the affirmative action context. The whole idea of
the "Driving While Mexican" scenario perpetuates the oppression of
racial minorities by buying in to a derogatory stereotype (i.e., Mexicans as
"illegal aliens").4° Powell's decision to allow the use of race as a factor in
Brignoni-Ponce reflects the relevance of race but perpetuates the continua-
tion of racial oppression through the reinforcement of a stereotype and
harassment of a marginalized ethnic group. Moreover, another adverse
effect of having race be a permissible factor in immigration enforcement is
35. CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE CUTTING EDGE xiv (Richard Delgado ed., 1995).
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.; see also Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Bd. of Education and the Interest-
Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. R-Ev. 518 (1980).
39. See supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text.
40. See, e.g., Kevin R. Johnson, Public Benefits and Immigration: The Intersection of
Immigration Status, Ethnicity, Gender, and Class, 42 UCLA L. REV. 1509, 1545-46 (1995)
("The stereotypical 'illegal alien,' the term that replaced 'wetback,' is a Mexican who has
snuck into the United States in the dark of night. The image in the minds of many is that
of a poor, brown, unskilled young male.").
[VOL. 6:195
Racial Profiling
that race becomes the only factor in automobile border stops. As Kevin
Johnson notes, the INS's own statistics reveal that close to 90% of remov-
als are of Mexicans and Latin Americans, even though they comprise only
about half of the total undocumented immigrant population in the United
States.41 In contrast, affirmative action programs uplift the status of mi-
norities by affording them de facto opportunity in view of the statistical
42disparities in performance on so-called "merit" tests, and therefore, race
crits would distinguish and applaud Powell's opinion in Bakke to permit
the consideration of race in university admissions programs.
Thus, CRT goes one step further than Justice Powell in adding nu-
ance and context to the "racial profiling" debates of the left and right.
While Powell adds one layer of complexity by explicitly acknowledging
the relevance of race in both the automobile stop and affirmative action
cases, CRT adds another by providing a principled reason for determining
whether race should be. used in light of its relevance to the existing power
dynamic in America.
Why did Powell fail to draw a normative distinction between the use
of race in the two contexts? Race crits might posit that a man of White,
upper-class privilege such as Justice Powell sadly might not have realized
how allowing for the inclusion of race as a factor would perpetuate racial
oppression against Latinos.43 After all, his race was not the one that was
being targeted at the border and would not be bettered by prohibiting
reliance on race.
A better use of race would be to require border agents to stop every
44motorist, making race a factor for all by making it a factor for none.
Indeed, racial profiling at the border becomes even less justifiable in light
41. See Johnson, supra note 2, at 48.
42. See supra note 3 (citing scholarly support for affirmative action programs); see also
Romero, supra note 27, at 21-22.
43. Indeed, Justice Powell's failure to recognize the disparate impact of the death
penalty on blacks in McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987), has been the fodder of
much commentary. See, e.g., John H. Blume, Theodore Eisenberg & Sheri Lynn John-
ston, Post-McCleskey Racial Discrimination Claims in Capital Cases, 83 CORNELL L. REv.
1771 (1998); Randall L. Kennedy, McCleskey v. Kemp: Race, Capital Punishment, and the
Supreme Court, 101 HARV. L. Rav. 1388 (1988). There are at least two other examples of
Powell's spotty record in civil rights cases: First, prior to being appointed to the Supreme
Court, Powell was a member of the board of the Richmond School District in the post-
Brown era, during which time he failed to strongly advocate for desegregation in the
Richmond schools, due perhaps to his belief that Brown was wrongly decided. See JOHN
C. JEFFRIES, JR., JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 140-41 (1994). Second, and more recently,
Powell provided the fifth and deciding vote in Bowers v. Hardwick, in which the Court
decided that the right to homosexual sodomy was not fundamental under the due process
clause. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
44. The Court, in fact, approved the Border Patrol's use of stationary checkpoints
against a Fourth Amendment challenge in United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543
(1976), another opinion by Justice Powell.
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of a New York Times article from earlier this year suggesting that the INS
does not even bother deporting undocumented immigrants anymore, only
those who they discover later have criminal records." The article reported
that because of the booming United States economy and these undocu-
mented immigrants' willingness to do work no United States workers will
perform, the INS is concentrating its deportation efforts elsewhere. 46 If
that is true, what then becomes the justification for using race as a factor
to patrol the border if the INS cares not what happens as long as these
"illegal aliens" find gainful employment, which is what motivates many to
cross the border in the first place?
47
I take solace in the Ninth Circuit's recent decision in United States v.
Montero-Camargo,5 in which the court sitting en banc appeared to set aside
Brignoni-Ponce and held that the Border Patrol could not consider
"Hispanic appearance" a factor in the context of an immigration stop in
light of the changing demographics of southern California. 49 A race crit
might view Montero-Camargo as an acknowledgment that, more often than
not, "Mexican appearance" is but a stereotypical proxy for an undocu-
mented immigrant rather than a logical criterion. In short, while
"Mexican appearance" may be a factor in some cases, it should not be one
because of its high irrelevance and its disproportionate impact on Latinos
at the border, most of whom are legally in this country.
At least in the affirmative action context, Justice Powell correctly
understood the reality of racial politics better than many today who
champion the policy's demise. Powell realized that the equality of persons
of color depended on true opportunity;50 indeed, his concept of
45. See Louis Uchitelle, I.N.S. Is Looking The Other Way As Illegal Immigrants Fill Jobs:
Enforcement Changes in Face of Labor Shortage, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 2000, at Al, C16.
46. See id.
47. Positive attractions that "pull" undocumented immigrants into the United States
include "economic opportunity, political freedom, personal safety, and family unifica-
tion." STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW AND POLIcY 55 (2d ed.
1997). For a discussion on the economics of immigration, see, e.g., Howard F. Chang,
Liberalized Immigration as Free Trade: Economic Welfare and the Optimal Immigration Policy,
145 U. PA. L. REV. 1147 (1997).
48. 208 F.3d 1122 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc).
49. See id. at 1135; see also James Sterngold, Appeals Court Voids Ethnic Profiling in
Searches, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 2000, at A16 ("In a strongly worded decision, [the Ninth
Circuit] declared . .. that because of the growth in the Hispanic population [in the San
Diego area], ethnicity was an irrelevant criterion for law officers to stop a person, unless
there was other very specific information identifying the suspect.").
50. See Regents of Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 306 n.43 (1978)
("To the extent that race and ethnic background were considered only to the extent of
curing established inaccuracies in predicting academic performance, it might be argued
that there is no preference at all.").
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"diversity"" has been trumpeted by many universities both pre- and post-
Bakke.12 But in this post-Hopwood, post-Prop. 209, post-Initiative 200
world, Professor Bell's "interest-convergence" theory 3 strikes a chord:
While the majority culture is willing to tolerate the continued burden on
many Latinos of "looking Mexican" in the context of automobile stops at
the border, it is unwilling to risk its members being burdened by the use
of race as a factor in university admissions.
Regardless of one's view on the issue of racial profiling in automo-
bile stops and affirmative action, I hope I have demonstrated why it is
important to look beyond soundbite liberal and conservative views on the
issue, and acknowledge, as Justice Powell did, that race matters. More
importantly, however, we must take the next step and ask, as critical race
theorists suggest, should race matter? An honest examination of the dispa-
rate distribution of power in American society provides a consistent
approach for deciding when race should be a factor in government deci-
sion-making.
51. See id. at 311-12 ("[Diversity] is clearly a constitutionally permissible goal for an
institution of higher education.").
52. See id. at 316-19 (implying that the Harvard admissions program is constitution-
ally permissible).
53. See supra note 38.
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